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DISCUSSION
CHECKS AND BALANCES: EUROPEAN COMPETITION
LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW
By Philip Marsden
PROFESSOR WALLER: Welcome back. In marathon
terms, we have completed the first 10 kilometers or so.
DOCTOR MARSDEN: Are we at Wellesley yet?
PROFESSOR WALLER: I don't know. You will have to
tell me Monday. I think we're off to a great start. Obviously
many of the issues are going to kind of crisscross between the four
sessions that in no way are intended to be airtight. And I
think what you'll find is some interesting things in looking at
these papers. We have the first of our EU presentations. Both of
the EU papers have a heavy procedural view and/or institutional
view about the way the rule of law questions play out in
the competition area.
I think our discussion from Maurice's paper, and I'm sure
with Elbert's paper as well, show at least the two U.S. that focus
much more on what are the substance rules that are going to be
applied. I think it's interesting. I'm not sure how much I want to
make of it. And I hope as we continue with the discussion, we
will address one thing that I saw that we left out a little bit in the
first paper. That is discussion of the role of agency guidelines
because as much as we focus on court decisions, they are the tip
of the iceberg in a variety of different ways. In merger law and
elsewhere, case law, at least in the U.S., is often quite old and
quite at a high level of generality. The agencies have tried to fill
in the gaps with long, complicated guidelines and commentary
and other things to sort of fill in the gaps. Now it's my pleasure
to introduce our co-host, Phil Marsden, to discuss checks and
balances in the European competition market.
DOCTOR MARSDEN: Mine is really a little bit of an
amuse bouche in a way to the far more substantive paper that
Tim Cowen has prepared that looks at the European courts. But
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I hope that some of what I am going to address picks up our
earlier discussion.
I want to look at three areas that come from the rule of
law principle. The first area is the exercise of control and
discretion. is the law supreme in that sense? Is it something
where we can feel happy about the expertise being exercised?
And is it something where we understand the decisions and we
feel they are fully objective?
Secondly, is the case handling and allocation within
Europe consistent and accountable? Could there be more done to
make sure that there is consistency, not just to please the
hobgoblins of mediocre minds, but to ensure true equality before
the law? And thirdly, is the law really being interpreted and
enforced by the courts, or really are the agencies running the
show?
So with respect to the first issue, with respect to the
control of discretion and expertise, the issue here that has come
up in a recent OECD study is the fact that DGCompetition investigates, prosecutes, and adjudicates.
Are there enough checks and balances on this multitasking? Of course the Commission's findings are subject to
appeal, but in reality that is a very limited review and so the
agency has set up a range of internal checks on itself. Now there
are multiple checks and balances within DG-Competition. There
is the new 'fresh pair of eyes' procedure and peer review within
DG-Competition, there is review by the Chief Economist, the
involvement of the Hearing Officer and other ways to try to
ensure there is some form of due process of decision making.
That said, there are some lingering gaps. At hearings,
when they happen, there is no real right to cross-examine
a witness. No other jurisdiction in the world has decision-making
responsibility where the Commissioner, her Director General, and
her senior staff are not required to attend the oral hearings. And
there has been an argument raised in courts as to whether or not
this fact raises human rights issues because any tribunal that
imposes quasi-criminal penalties should be independent and
impartial, rather than simply being made up of the case team
itself, or having decisions made by a far-removed and distant
College of Commissioners.
So suggestions for reform: perhaps there should be
separate functions within DG-Competition where you should
involve senior staff more, require the director general to attend
oral hearings or separate the functions such that DG-Competition
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investigates and prosecutes. Then you move more to the Justice
Department model where'the Commission is required to bring a
case to the Court of First Instance to adjudicate and determine
whether or not a case has been made, and particularly whether a
fine is appropriate. That is the first area relating to-the control of
internal checks and balances within one agency, the European
Commission.
The second topic, relating to consistency, involves
the European Competition Network, a mechanism by which the
authorities exchange information and allocate cases amongst
themselves. There is an argument that the ECN operates a
bit like a black box. Nobody, other than the officials, knows how
the cases
are allocated.
And
there
is
concern that
something untoward might be going on. Again this relates to a
lack of transparency that I was raising in the previous panel.
There's a general fear of the unknown that is natural.
There is an argument from the officials that actually 'no,
don't worry, we prepare reportsfor you, there's been 800 cases or
so in the last few years and we've referred this many cases to
this many authorities, two or three authorities are working on
this case one on that, and it is all just mechanical and boring so
we don't need to disclose more.' Of course that kind of response is
both true and naive, considering the huge interests that are
involved in some cases, both corporate and political. But the
main complaint that still arises is this lack of transparency, this
black box argument. In addition to that, there is also a concern
about a lack of consistency of decision making amongst
the authorities.
Now I am going to focus on the Article 82 monopolization
provision here with the caveat that the national authorities
have been allowed to have a stricter approach to the enforcement
of Article 82 than is required under European law. So obviously
some inconsistency was provided for at the creation so to speak.
That said, some of the inconsistency raises concerns from a
rule of law point of view. There are RPM practices banned per se
in Italy and Holland but the same practice by the same parties is
approved in Spain. You have the Michelin II rebates banned
and fined quite heavily at the European level but approved in
France. And there is a very nice point stemming from the British
Airways case banning loyalty-based commissions to travel agents.
Here the European Court of Justice upheld the Commission's
prohibition and fine so there was a clear statement of what
European law was in this area. The OFT responded by shutting
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down its same cases in that area on the basis of lack of resources
and lack of enforcement priorities.
It's a nice way of one authority signaling to the rest of the
authorities that it doesn't believe in this theory of harm, or these
kind of cases, but doing it in a way more like a fudge than
anything else. Perhaps they were trying to use it as a nudge of
sorts, to move European law on a bit. Nice, but effective? After
all, case law at the ECJ presumably has more precedence
throughout all of Europe than the act of one national agency.
I appreciate that each member state has different
different
priorities, different legal regimes,
enforcement
structures, different operating systems. But on the other hand,
DG-Competition and European law is supposed to oversee this.
And there is a question with respect to how much
the Commission should perhaps be intervening to preserve the
acquis communautaire. There

is a

process

by

which

the

Commission can intervene to alter these national cases. And
we haven't seen much of that yet. Presumably to ensure national
buy-in first.
So there are suggestions related to whether the agencies
should, when they are shutting down these cases or taking
different decisions, do more to at least publish their decisions and
be a bit more forthcoming on their theory of harm so that you
have that discussion about what is really motivating some of
these case closures or decisions. So basically once more from me,
a call for greater transparency, which might lead to greater
understanding, greater consistency, or at least more informed
divergence.
Finally a few words on the court, which Tim will address
more directly. The issue here is that in a way, the European
courts have been a victim of their own success. There is a huge
backlog of cases. Anybody who has appeared before the
European courts will know it's not a judicial system that they
might be familiar with on this side of the Atlantic. There is quite
an extensive pleading system where supposedly all the facts do
get out and experts are questioned by the court. But there isn't a
system of cross-examination or thorough fact-finding. It is more a
system of administrative judicial review than an actual appeal.
One of the points that I would like to raise is the
requirement of unanimity in the judgments: some cases have
resulted in a situation where there is just a repetition of the law as
opposed to an actual evolution of the law, and perhaps this
requirement of unanimity should be rethought. If judges
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are allowed to dissent or write concurring opinions, you might
see a richer jurisprudence developing. And I do think at this
stage, just a few decades but still European law is robust now, it
can handle a system of concurring opinions or even dissents and
that would make European law a lot richer.
The last point: in the Europe context at least,
the introduction of more use of the rule of reason could help
matters from a rule of law point of view. At least then, with the
use of more rule of reason analysis, judges will be required
to explain their theories more as opposed to relying on more
formalistic points of view. So rule of reason balancing, married to
some transparency might help bolster faith in the process of
decision making.
MR. CALVANI: During the first session this morning, it
was suggested that the asymmetry of plaintiffs' win/loss record in
private rule of reason cases was evidence of a problem. It is not.
The fact that plaintiffs lose approximately ninety percent of these
cases does not establish that something is wrong.
For
the
benefit
of the
European
participants,
it's important to understand a little bit about private litigation in
the United States. Much of it is class action litigation. And good
class action litigators need to get a case on file early to stake
out their territory and advance their claim to be lead counsel.
Sometimes an obscene amount of money is at stake. As a result,
cases are filed predicated with very little informationsometimes only a snippet of a story that might have appeared in
the Financial Times or the Wall Street Journal. But that is
sufficient to prompt the race to the courthouse.
The good plaintiff's lawyer is very much like the Texas
wildcatter drilling wells. He or she has to drill a lot of holes to
strike oil. The win/loss record is going to be asymmetrical. Filing
suits based on very limited information is similar; there will be
lots of dry holes. It is not surprising at all that many cases are
dismissed, and it is certainly not evidence of a problem.
But now
to the assigned task. When Doctor
Marsden asked your commentator to critique his paper, he asked
for kindness, which your commentator rather disingenuously
promised. Nevertheless, it is the commentator's lot to wield the
hatchet, and this one fully intended to do so. But despite best
efforts, the high quality of the paper renders harsh criticisms
impossible. It is a fine paper, and the first part is exceptionally so.
To the question of who guards the guardians in Europe,
the answer is "no one." The noble lie is nonsense; DG-Comp is
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not capable of guarding itself any more than any government
agency. The "fresh pair of eyes" and quality control mission of the
Chief Economist are both good ideas. Substantial advances, but
they do not come close to providing independent checks. And the
idea that the College of Commissioners could fill that role cannot
be seriously maintained by anyone with the slightest familiarity
with the works of the Commission.
Dr. Marsden's focus on the OECD sources was spot on. If
fault can be found with the discussion, it is with the treatment of
the oral hearing. Note that Doctor Marsden stated that neither
the Director-General nor the Commissioner, much less the
College of Commissioners, attend the oral hearing. Doctor
Marsden implied that their absence was a problem. They should
have attended the oral hearing. That assumes that something of
importance occurs at the oral hearing making attendance
worthwhile.
Your commentator has attended many oral hearings, both
as an advocate for an addressee or as a member of the Member
State Advisory Committee. The oral hearing bears little
resemblance to a trial in a common law jurisdiction. Rather,
the Commission staff opens and briefly describes the Statement of
Objection. The immunity applicant, if there is one, follows with a
brief submission. The addressees then typically make what are
really jury summations, sometimes augmented by an economic
presentation. Oral hearings are very short when compared with
trials. One recent oral hearing, in an incredibly complicated case,
lasted one week. Each addressee took, on average, about
20 minutes to present their case. Evidence is seldom
critically examined. It is not a trial by any stretch of
the imagination.
One suspects that the reason why the Director-General
and Commissioners fail to attend oral hearings is because they
are not important. What is missing, and what is important, is
some forum to test the evidence. Consider an email contained in
the Commission file purportedly memorializing the content of a
meeting. There is no way to cross-examine the author to test his
memory, etc. Even though an addressee may contest the accuracy
of the evidence in its response to the Statement of Objections,
there is no opportunity to really test the evidence from either
perspective.
Turning briefly to the European Competition Network,
your commentator was a member of the Member State Advisory
Committee that considered several aspects of Modernization.
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Issues are inevitable. It is too early in the day to render any
informed assessment of the ECN success.
Focusing briefly on the community courts, Judge Cooke's
-comment, which Dr. Marsden memorializes, is certainly curious.
It may be a very good thing that Judge Cooke is no longer in
Luxembourg and is now back in Dublin. Generally the
community courts have played an important, but insufficient,
role in reviewing the actions of the Commission in competition
cases.
MR. McGRATH: I'll just bring a UK flavor in on it and
pick up on Phil's mention of the desire for transparency.
Somehow it's a negative view of use of the administrative
priority, and as somebody who contributed to that development
of that policy, I guess I just need to'defend it a bit but also show
how it strengthens my point about being called into getting
judicial oversight.
In brief, the history in the UK was that in the early days of
the Competition Act, after 2000, the office received about 1,200
investigates
optimistically
a year
and
complaints
twelve, pessimistically three or four a year. So they had to reject a
lot, and case handlers were trying to be helpful and would tend to
say "We're not going to take this complaint forward because it
doesn't show what you would call antitrust harm. It doesn't show
an infringement of the law."
And in its desire to get some cases under its belt, the
appeal tribunal viewed those cases as full non-infringement
decisions, which I think subverted the intention of the statute.
But you can understand why it wanted to look at these and
only had jurisdiction to review full non-infringement decisions.
Form doesn't matter. It's about reaching a view of whether the
law has been infringed or not; if so, we can look at it. And these
then got subjected to full merit appeal with all the panoply of
barristers on one side and barristers on the other with a lot of indepth factual analysis. This meant the OFT got poked down in a
lot of these cases for no, I would argue, real benefit. And the only
way out of that particular hole was to use the administrative
discretion route.
I remember a meeting I had when I was at the OFT with
my counterpart, the Department of Justice over here, and one of
the big headaches was sports cases. We had a ream of cases
involving horse racing which was an incredible amount of
antitrust law in the UK. And I said, how do you deal with sports
cases? We just don't do them. We leave it to the private club to
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do sports cases. We don't use arbitrating fights between
American football stars and their agents and the clubs and you
know, it's just not for us. Administrative discretion.
And I thought and I also think it's quite legitimate
because the original approach that we were advised to do by the
lawyers in the OFT was to say .we're rejecting this complaint but
don't view this as a decision. This isn't the decision. It was a very
sort of sophistic and rather confusing approach, even confusing
for a lawyer, small businessman, or consumer who had received
this letter and asked what it was.
I used to say if you generally don't think it's a good case
and a good use of your time, then it's legitimate to say that. It's
legitimate to say this is not a priority. We are not going to take it
on. That presupposes that you have priorities and you can
say what your priorities are. And I think problems can arise
still where you get a mixing up of what are the reasons for
dismissing a case.
And I think the City Cook case is a fascinating example of
where cases get rejected. I won't go into the facts, it's a bit too
long and tedious, too personal, painful a memory that case. But
essentially you had both the administrative court and the
competition appeal tribunal of the court reviewing the OFT's
reason for closing the case. And effectively the OFT was saying
we can't decide whether this is a clearly object-based case,
effectively per se infringement, or whether this is an effects case;
in other words, a rule of reason case because it would take so long
to argue this as an effects case and because we haven't done it as
effects case. It was very familiar to all these rule of reason cases
where we have to do economic analysis of the service. We decided
to just close it because it becomes a prioritized issue not worth
doing all the work. That's a bit problematic when you get into
that territory.
But essentially, to conclude, their approach is to
administer the claims using a priority system even though
competition transparency is not a bad thing. I think it's
particularly interesting in that context to see how the European
Commission has recognized that and to see what the law is
in Article 82 and frankly how bad some of the law is in Article 82.
Say we are going to use administrative priority in effect and this
is how we do it. I don't think the outcome is actually that great
but I certainly understand how they ended up there.
PROFESSOR ROBERTSON: I wanted to say to Phil, in
light of Professor Stucke's presentation this morning and some of

Loyola Consumer Law Review

Vol. 22:1

the points I will make later this afternoon, the movement towards
the rule of reason that you are suggesting that the Europeans
might also want to make, is one perhaps we'll want to make, but
you won't be able to say you weren't forewarned.
There might be norms that' exist in the continental
traditional notions of fairness and reciprocity that, combined with
an enlightened use of economics and political sensibilities, might
make for an effective competition policy. It could utilize a rule of
reason better than we're using it here right now; we are clearly in
an era in which the per se rule is devolving.
I would like to make a second point which is, with all due
respect to Terry Calvani, who was my Commissioner when I was
a fledgling economist-in-training at the FTC back in the early
1980s, there is something fundamentally wrong with an
adversary system that essentially dictates that ninety percent of
the time plaintiffs are going to lose. There is something wrong
with a system like that regardless of whether or not we're dealing
with class actions or individual private antitrust enforcement
suits. And what is wrong with it is that the universe of false
negative space is just way, way too big. And it is so unjustifiably
big that raw substantive notions of equal justice for both parties
under the rule of law I think are lost. There is therefore an affront
at a very basic level to the concept of both procedural and
substantive justice in an adversarial legal process that preordains
that type of overwhelming result.
That being said, I would like to make one last point about
the rule of law. The binding force of the rule of law, however, is
that we will accede to the legitimacy of the system, even to one
that offers such a lopsided result, as long as the formalistic
process that produces it is one that is clear and transparent with
all of the other sort of formal features that go along with the rule
of law in place.
The last point I would like to make is a warning about the
rule of reason to the extent that you hope rule of reason
balancing is a way out of rigid civil law formalism that could be
hampering competition in the European context. The rule of
reason has its own formalistic elements that are highly
problematic and Professor Stucke's paper speaks to those
elements and their pitfalls very clearly, and I'll talk about that a
little bit later on today also. But you can't say you
weren't warned.
MR. CAMPBELL: I'm a rule of reason guy. I don't know
how much empirical work has been done on how important the
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transaction costs are in doing rule of reason type cases, relative to
how important false positives and false negatives are.
The problem of per se rules in this area is that economics are
complex and it's hard to get per se rules that do a good job and
leave relatively few false positives and false negatives.
That is just my gut feeling from what I've seen in my
practice. I can't support it quantitatively, but my sense is that
this is an area that actually responds well to allowing for
fairly fact-intensive , and
economics-intensive
case-bycase analysis on most kinds of issues.
The thing that I think is most notable once you get into a
zone of discretion, as opposed to tight rules, is a book I read
many years ago called DiscretionaryJustice by K.C. Davis.' He
starts with the premise that discretion is not necessarily always a
negative thing. It actually has a number of very positive aspects
in a wide range of contexts, not just courts but tribunals
and indeed public officials, police officers, the whole range.
David suggests three basic things. One, to figure out how
much you want to confine the discretion, so there is some place
for some rules in this process. Once you figure out the zone of
discretion, his view is that factors and processes are critical.
Structuring is his term, which includes things like guidelines,
reasoned decisions and transparency. I think this is where the
action really is in this field in terms of getting good decisionmaking.
And then checking is Davis' term for a broad umbrella of
review mechanisms that include internal hierarchical decisionmaking processes within an organization, peer review or
whatever other internal checks may exist, as well as the level of
supervision that you get externally.
So from my point of view, the work to be done should
focus on the structuring and checking. If you start, as I do, from a
premise that rule of reason is useful for fairly open, textured laws
with a fairly broad scope for facts and economics to be in play,
then you work on how you get good processes that are reasonably
streamlined.
MR. SAVRIN: In my comments I want to first extol the
virtues of the rule of reason approach and then address the issue
that Terry raised with respect to foreclosing access to relief,
whether that really is a problem in the U.S. system and whether it
I K.C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
(Greenwood Publishing Group 1969).
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makes sense for a rule of reason approach to be adopted in the
European system.
I think there is a problem with looking at the raw numbers
and just saying ninety percent f the cases are dismissed on
motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment in the U.S.
and not separating that point from the lure of treble damages. I
think functionally a lot of these issues arise because, given the
lure of treble damages, cases are brought that are not (1) genuine
antitrust cases, or (2) genuinely addressing anticompetitive
behavior. So if you're going to challenge the merits of rule of
reason, which I am a big fan of, I think you really need to dig
down and look at those motions to dismiss and motions for
summary judgment and see whether there really was something
of a genuine and viable antitrust claim stated and whether it was
truly unjust not to allow that case to go forward and allow for
some recovery in that circumstance.
Secondly, I do think that the rule of reason does allow
some predictability because it does require a court to analyze and
put forth an opinion as to why certain behavior is viewed as
permissible or impermissible. And in that context it does provide
guidance and commercial actors can look at the decisions, can
look at the guidelines from the various agencies, and can in that
balance do what it is that they essentially do all the time, cost
benefit analyses of what is the practical business opportunity and
whether the benefits to them outweigh the anticipated harm to
competition arguments.
If you're looking at whether it makes sense to adopt it in
the EU, I think one of the things I hear from EU practitioners is
that transparency, given the amount of decisions and guidance
that you get in the U.S. on standards, is far greater here. The
existence of those decisions and guidance flows from the fact that
we have the rule of reason.
So to your last point in Philip's paper, I do think the rule
of reason would get you to greater transparency. There may be
lessons - as much as you would like to learn from our experience
in treble damages how better to deal with private damages
actions - from how we deal with the rule of reason. I think, as a
baseline point, use of the rule of reason approach will bring
greater transparency in the system, give greater guidance, and
will allow commercial actors to really figure out, within the
confines of the decisions, what conduct has been found
inappropriate or appropriate so that they can reasonably guide or
modify their behavior going forward.
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MR. AHLBORN: I want to pick up a point which Terry
made earlier, the question of validation of evidence which I do
think is one of the weaknesses of the system. Even worse though
not clear is what evidence or what standard of proof and what
standard of evidence is even required after more than fifty years
of case law. You still don't know what the status is you work
for. I think at least two reasons. One is to pursue even if you
don't care much about facts. I think the other problem is if
you administer the system which is not adversarial I think you
get inferior outcomes.
And the last point of course is one element to value the
fact quantity of the court. If you look at the CFI and CJ, you
have a large number of members of the court who have actually
lost sort of a solid crown in law. Imagine a U.S. example where
you have Supreme Court judges who rule on the base of U.S.
federal law. That is the equivalent and quite a number
said actually sort of not my area of specialty. Then obviously
you'll have very, very cautious judicial review, and no one will
actually test the commission either as to facts. All those
fundamental weaknesses, which explains sort of a lot of the
decisions which you have in Europe.
PROFESSOR WALLER: I don't have any experience
with either the EU member state courts or the EU courts directly.
So I am going to focus my comments on questions of
agency discretion. One is to Becket, which is that our agencies
have that discretion because of our vigorousness, in some
people's view too vigorous a system of private litigation.
Obviously that is also an issue for the EU currently. So you have
to have viable private rights of action before an agency can
simply punt to the private sector. And I'm fascinated because I
do read a lot of European Court of First Instance and ECJ
decisions, and there are a fair number of them on appeal
from decisions not to initiate complaints. This is fascinating for
an American because we don't have any equivalent of that other
than the occasional press release explaining why something
wasn't challenged. I read these things and yet I wonder to what
extent do they really control agency discretion for DG-Comp
because I can't think of more than one really important case
where the court really ever said you should have been initiated
when you choose not to. I think it's Sony-Impala?2 Beyond that
2

Case C-413/06 P, Bertelsmann AG. v. Indep. Music Publishers and

Labels Ass'n, (July 10, 2008) available at http://curia.europa.eu.
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I'm not sure. They're lengthy and they seem to inevitably
validate the decision that it was an appropriate use of discretion
not to proceed with whatever the matter is. So if that's guarding
the guardians, that struck-me as somewhat elusive.
Phil, do you want to respond to anything?
DOCTOR MARSDEN: I'd just like to pick up
on something Elbert said earlier, and Spencer's paper that I
mentioned earlier about whether the Chicago School is a virus
and finally my point that European Union law is already immune
from any infection by the 'Law and Economics' movement.
Let's accept that the concerns for fairness and distribution
and the related Ordoliberal concerns in Europe about power will
never-go away. Now, one benefit of the call for a more economic
approach and greater reliance on rule of reason analysis would
allow these faith-based populist concerns to be tested. Not by the
narrow strictures of Chicago School antitrust because we know
what will happen; they would be rejected. But since the Chicago
School has no traction in Europe, it may well be that the fairness
concerns will be tested and supported by new economic, new
institutional and game theory thinking. That would help build
the acceptability of the concerns themselves and any enforcement
based on them.
You see this in certain aspects in the Microsoft case in the
European Union where there are interesting theories of harm
that were
developed
in
that
case
that
are
not
necessarily something that harkens back to 1960 is U.S.
antitrust, but
something
that
actually
involves
some
new theorizing that should be tested.
I'm just querying the system in Europe, the inadequate
oral hearing system and limited judicial review of the European
Commission's analysis. The court will tend to defer to the
Commission because the Commission is the expert, especially in
monopolization cases. So I'm hoping a greater introduction of the
rule of reason will bring out and test any new theory of harm, so
it's not hidden behind old dogma.
MR. COWEN: I'll pick my way through this. I'm reading
it.
It struck me that what Harry said before the break
worried me in the context of what Becket said, so let me try to
explain why I was worried. He said: "well it's okay to have
the politics and the politicians appointing the enforcement
agencies." Okay? I was then thinking about what Neil said in
terms of prosecutorial discretion and the rule of law..
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If you have a policy maker who is able to make a decision
in the context of evidence, discretion, transparency, clarity, and
a system that gives rise to a predictable outcome, is that enough?
The basic issue, and one of the nice examples that Lord Bingham
refers to, points out that any legislator transgresses a
fundamental principle of justice if as he points out, it would be
impossible, even if democratically elected, to pass a law that only
related to redheaded people. I thought well, fair enough, and does
prosecutorial discretion only to prosecute redheaded people
actually then amount to the same thing as a law against
redheaded people? If you have a policy that allows a discretion in
the hands of the policeman to only pick on redheaded people, you
have a general law which is only applicable by the policeman
directly, they seem to me amount to the same thing: a lack of rule
of law. You have a fundamental lack of justice there.
And listening to this question, it seems that maybe
Microsoft probably might be one of the redheaded people. It
doesn't seem to be terribly fair to pick only the people you choose
to pick on when you have the evidence in the system. Where is
the objective process that gathers evidence impartially and
assesses each new economic theory in that way?
In the U.S. system, I'm interested, very interested, to
understand more about that prosecutorial discretion and how it's
exercised. It certainly appears to me in my experience over
the last eight years that that has been heavily politicized. And
then if you contrast that with the European experience, the
question really is "Where is the Policy?" At least with the U.S. it's
clear here that politicians make policy and that this has been a
very clearly politicized system, a problem one way. There's a
problem the other way in identifying the political mandate: how
does that work actually in Europe?
PROFESSOR STUCKE: A couple of responses. One of
them is that regardless of how we may feel that the rule of reason
is working, the Supreme Court believes that antitrust is broken.
And if they feel that antitrust is broken, then is that
more determinative than our individual belief? If they think so
and they're going to construct rules that are going to create
barriers for the plaintiffs, that may be more determinative than
how we may individually feel about it.
Secondly, with respect to Daniel's point about treble
damages, I would be sympathetic to that claim if ninety percent
or more of plaintiffs in state UDAP claims, those are state unfair
and deceptive acts and practices where in several states you can
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get multiple damages. If those plaintiffs' claims are being
dismissed ninety percent as well as civil RICO claims as well as
common law fraud claims with punitive damages, I wonder to
what extent are plaintiffs now just simply abandoning antitrust
and going into other areas of law such as business tort. So I don't
know to what extent, I mean there is always a claim in treble
damages
in antitrust somehow. I don't know if it's
empirically supported because the level of cases brought
can
in
number,
increasing
although
since Sylvania,3
be misleading if they themselves are not the levels they were at
the time that Sylvania was brought.
With respect to Phil's point, I don't think necessarily you
need a full-blown rule of reason in order to introduce economics.
I think you can engage in some sort of legal presumptions
based on the available empirical evidence. You can then say, the
person who writes about this where you can have these
differentiated rules based on the available empirical, and then
you make some sort of proxy, eighty percent of the time is likely
to be anticompetitive, and the magnitude of such effects we can
then sacrifice twenty percent, or you can create sort of a safe
harbor.
And then the final point, Tim will address this, but you
raise it in your paper as well, is the extent of having courts to deal
with antitrust. And I had two thoughts about that. First is that
feasibly, can you divorce competition law from the rest of society,
and Tim raises that in his paper and Diane Wood has a nice
paper to that effect as well for us. And secondly, is that an
admission of failure? Are we saying then that the law is
so complex that not even a generalist court much less a business
executive can readily apply the standards? We need to
have specialists who should undertake this.
MR. BRUNELL: I hate to be the one always commenting
about whose ox is being gored. In the U.S., the FTC has this nice
judicial-type administrative procedure with cross-examination
of witnesses. And a lot of folks here are not particularly happy
with seeing cases go to the FTC, notwithstanding this judicial
procedure, because they know the result is going to be that at the
end of the day, the commissioners are going to rule in favor of the
complainant's counsel and then maybe there is judicial review
down the road. Sometimes the commissioners do get reversed.
I'm just curious whether in Europe part of the impetus for
3

Cont'l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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a more judicial-type of hearing before the Commission
has anything to do with getting the decisions to be made by the
courts rather than DG Comp.
PROFESSOR FIRST: Well, I really enjoyed your paper.
As a U.S. antitrust person, I always am thankful for Europe.
Gives us something else to write about and say, Oh my God you
have antitrust some place, which is good.
But your paper and Terry's comments show the flip side,
which we may tend to overlook in the U.S., because what I hear
in your paper is that the process isn't so great in Europe and it's
not great in ways that we in the U.S. think we have.
And particularly your comments about what do these
hearings look like, you can't really get to fact-finding
determinations. Well, you don't have the right mechanisms. So
I'm sitting here thinking we call our proceedings "trials." We call
fact finders "juries." And despite what the Court has been
doing consistently in antitrust cases, which is, oh my God, we
don't want to get them into court, and we don't want juries,
juries are really the great driver for finding facts. They might not
find them perfectly but it's a mechanism to test things where you
have to present evidence. And so we tend to lose sight of
that aspect of how things happen in the United States and maybe
it also has an interplay with what legal standards we have.
That goes with a question that I have that was sort of
threaded through your paper, which is this notion of consistency
as part of the rule of law, and I just would like to suggest that we
don't get too carried away with the virtue of consistency. One of
the things. we do get from comparative institutions is comparing.
We have natural experiments. And we need to make better use of
that, so we can compare how things happen in the states, how
things happen in Europe. But actually really compare them.
In Europe, judging from your comments, there is a lot of
this weird inconsistency. Who knows what the Russians are
laughing at? We have no idea. In the U.S., the desire for
consistency has tended to be muted recently because we know
what the consistency is. The defendant always wins, and the
Justice Department says fine. So that's pretty consistent. But
we also overlook a little of the inconsistencies which are potential
and sometimes bubble up. We have state enforcers. They don't
take the view. We do have inter-circuit disparities, differences
among
the circuits too, as litigators
know. Litigators
are conscious of these things. We can learn from these
inconsistencies.
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I was struck by the declination decision and talking about
the reviewability of declinations in Europe. There is a reason why
we don't spend a lot of time on them in the U.S. They're
not reviewable in the United States by courts in any area that we
have got. We don't review declinations of prosecution. Now there
is something to compare. We have two different sorts of
institutions. Unanimity on panels versus dissents in the U.S.
There is a lot of work done on panel effects in appellate decisions
and the correlation between political affiliations and panel
decisions. So we do have a lot to learn by a lack of consistency.
The problem from a defendant's point of view is these are
experiments and no one likes to be the guinea pig. So that's a
little problem.
Finally, on the politics, I was interested in how you heard
what I said because I like what you heard, Tim, but I'm not sure
that's completely what I said. I do like political values. The
question is political control of the enforcers and how correct or
incorrect that is. The state enforcers are elected. State agencies
are elected. Antitrust people seem to hate this. You would
think that would be good from a democratic point of view. For
federal enforcers, political control is less direct and for Europe
it's less less less direct. I think these are important things to look
at, how that political control works, and to think through.
Political values, this is a hard thing to dice, and it's not
just-is Microsoft redheaded (a redhead sounds communist to
me)? But there are political values to think about that are
involved in antitrust, some that are appropriate and maybe some
that are less. One may be taking account of distributive effects,
which we have stopped doing but may be an important political
value you want to think about.
Concentration, I hate to say it, concentration of economic
power is a political value. We washed that out some time ago.
Maybe we want to wash it back in. And these are the sort of
underlying political values that come in and out of antitrust, and
I think there is a place, I think they're always there, it's just a
question of whether we consciously think about them or not.
PROFESSOR HYLTON: There were two very general
topics that came out of the talk that I wanted to touch on briefly.
One is whether the rule of reason constrains decision making, or
does it just give judges freedom
to exercise their
preferences without constraint. And the other is the separation of
powers issue that you raised.
So for the people who talked about the rule of reason
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issue, maybe I'll try to deal with that quickly. It's. true that one
way you can look at the rule of reason is that it forces judges to
state the grounds of their decisions, which provides information
and in that sense offers some predictability advantage and I think
in addition to that, that the process has a constraining
influence itself that shouldn't be discounted.
The best example I can point to is from the common
law of torts. I teach torts so I look at all these old cases. Take an
area like nuisance law. In the oldest nuisance law cases, you see
the judges acting as if it is almost like a field of applied
utilitarianism, the judges weighing the factors throughout. They
don't seem to be greatly constrained, there is not a whole lot of
earlier decisions for them to base their decisions on. And over
time what happens is the common law torts; the judges make the
bases of their decisions clear, and you begin to see what sort of
factors they're considering. Over time that crystallizes into the
form of hardened rules, and the Restatement publishes various
six-factor tests.
I have to say that the earlier decisions are often a lot better
in
stating
the grounds
of their
decisions
than
the
modern decisions. The modern opinions point to six-factor tests.
In that sense, the early common law, the discretionary fact-based
decision-making process, offers some advantages both in
predictability and in constraining judges. I don't think the sixfactor test approach that we see today in a lot of courts is
superior, or obviously superior to what we had.
My second point is about the separation of powers. The
notion behind the separation of powers is a notion of checks and
balances, but there is also this notion of different branches
jealously guarding
their areas
of control, and almost
a competition between these different branches. And the system
was designed for that kind of competition. You wonder whether
it can work when one. branch defers or says we're not going
to compete. We're going to defer to that other branch.
The same question appears in the newspapers now about
the current administration backing away from inherent powersbased arguments under the Constitution in the prosecution of
war. When in the European system you see the court of
first instance and other courts stating manifest error doctrines
and other rules that allow them to defer or require them to defer
to the EU Commission on some issues, that's a kind of backing
away, deferring to the EU Commission, letting them determine
the law to some extent, and I don't know if, and I wonder if,
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that's good in the long run for rule of law.
If it happened in the U.S., if the courts deferred to the
FTC, then I think that would be bad for rule of law, and the
reasoning of the law, because the FTC is under some political
control. You have different administrations moving from one
extreme to another. You would have the law, if the courts were
deferring to the FTC on its view of the law, changing frequently
depending on which administration gets into power. We have
independent courts that say we're going to do this our own way,
we're'going to set out the law, we're going to frame our own rule
of reason. We're not going to defer to the agency on these
issues. That gives a lot of predictability and stability to the law
that I think would be otherwise missing if you didn't have this
competition between different branches of government that are
jealously guarding what they are supposed to be in charge of.
I think those are my two reactions to the most general
questions that I see coming out of the talk.
PROFESSOR WALLER: As we approach lunchtime,
we'll have a couple of short comments. Just one thing, Keith,
your comment raises an interesting issue. There is a minor rule of
law issue in the United States which is whether the courts are
supposed to be deferring to the FTC or don't or at least are not
deferring to them to the same extent that they're deferring
to other administrative agencies that are similarly situated.
That's a real open question in the United States.
CAVANAGH:
I
have 'two very
PROFESSOR
quick remarks. One on discretion. It seems to me judicial
discretion is the hole in the donut. Without the donut, the hole is
not there.' So it has to be cabin by guidelines. And Spencer, I'm
just saying in civil procedure, supplemental jurisdiction form not
convenience where courts have offensive non-mutual issue. All
sorts of tests. Discretion by cabin by factors which you are
supposed to take into account. If the courts have that then I
think there is a way of keeping them in check. It's harder with
the agency, prosecutorial discretion you just don't have that. And
also because we know it's just not reviewable, at least in this
country not reviewable.
And the second thing is Maurice, you're dead-on right
about cases that were antitrust cases becoming other kinds of
cases. A WPK right here before Judge Saris in the District of
Mass in Boston,4 classic example of cases that started as antitrust
4

Alves v. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d. 198,

2009

Discussion- Marsden

cases with and RICO cases where consumer supplemental claims
the antitrust case, the antitrust case, RICO cases get tossed in, the
consumer cases are there and the defendants are getting hit for
millions of dollars. That's exactly what is happening. So the same
group of plaintiff lawyers, entrepreneur plaintiff lawyers, are
around just looking for the law and if it's not antitrust and it's
not securities and not RICO, now the gold mine right now is
consumer protection.
MR. McGRATH: On the transparency issue talking about
in terms of what Tim was talking about, transparency is nice in
principle and it's ideal, but I think there is a danger that
people refer to light into the magic in regard to the royal family. It
can actually, it can get in the way of agencies making the right
decisions, and I always take the approach, having been in the
agency, don't look at what the agency says look, at what it does.
And Article 82, the OFT basically isn't really doing
Article 82 Chapter 2 cases, other than business relation cases' .
Local business relation is one of these long running things where
the regime has changed in the UK but business relation cases
remains. But putting that to one side, it's not really doing those
cases. And I think that's not such a bad thing because I think you
can apply too much. OFT wasn't able to say that. In fact they
said the opposite. I would love some Article 82 cases. Great. Give
me your Article 82 cases. I will take them. And was that being
transparent, personally I'm not so sure, but what did that have to
be said in order to make sure that the funding kept coming for the
regime and the regime-maybe it did. Maybe I'm just being
cynical.
On the issue of discretion and margin of appreciation, I do
think you need to accept that the authorities should have some
margin of appreciation, some benefit. And the question is where
that is. One area I would say is market definition for example.
Because I had two cases in front of the appeals tribunal both
rejected, some on market definition and ultimately market
definition no matter what the economy may tell me, I think
is highly subjective and can be argued many different ways. And
if you show you've gone through certain procedures, certain
research, and find the market, you talk to the customer, did a
certain amount of things, you're not just relying on bare
212-214 (D. Mass. 2002), affd, 316 F.3d 290 (1st Cir. 2003).
' See, e.g., Maquarie/S.E. London & Kent Bus Co./E. London Bus &
Coach Co., Case No. COMP/M.4303, Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 Article
6(1)(b) Non-Opposition (Aug. 23, 2006).

82

Loyola Consumer Law Review

Vol. 22:1

assertions which many, many Europeans do this. Going
beyond that you should have the benefit of the doubt.
Once these sort of issues get reheard and reassessed
on appeal, then you're really in a lot of trouble because cases will
just not get off the ground and you can spend years putting
further layers on the analysis justifying the market definition
that you've adopted in that decision, but does that actually help
you? Does it lead to a better outcome, I'm not so sure.
PROFESSOR WALLER: We have reached the halfway
point. We're going to continue many of these items with Tim's
paper in the afternoon. Will we hit the wall? What will happen
when we get to heartbreak hill? Stay tuned. We have
lunch available.

